In accordance with the code of criminal procedure, the parties were allowed to provide rebuttal arguments.

Crimes against humanity

It was again demonstrated – and supported in particular by Swiss case law – that there are no obstacles to the prosecution and judgement of the crimes in question, including those that took place before 2011.

The prohibition of crimes against humanity is considered customary international law and the arguments of the defense that the legal elements were not fulfilled in this case could not be followed.

In the case of Ousman Sonko, the attack, its systematic and widespread character – as sufficiently described in the indictment – and the civilian nature of the targeted population were all proven elements. With regard to the latter, it was emphasized that the defense implying that some victims were criminals in the first place – or putschists with regard to the 2006 events – was irrelevant and not in line with case law.

Bai L.’s conviction in Germany was, in fact, further evidence that the contextual elements of the crime were met in The Gambia.

The persecution of journalists in the Gambia has been sufficiently proven and the Bai L. case was another example in support of this fact.

With regard to the defendant’s participation, it was recalled that he had been one of the strategists, planners and organizers and that he had always had an influential position in the overall structure of the cooperating authorities within the State.

Individual acts

Murder of a member of the State Guard in 2000 and subsequent sexual violence against the victim’s widow from 2000 onwards.

With regard to the murder, it was pointed out that the defense has ignored the results of the investigation as well as the findings of the TRRC in its closing arguments. Both actually proved that the victim was murdered, that the defendant was involved, and that the official government version to cover up this crime was a lie.

It was then recalled that the plaintiff’s credible statement regarding the sexual crimes she suffered was sufficient evidence to prove that the accused had committed the crimes. The allegation that she has accused him in revenge for the elimination of her husband was simply not plausible.

Acts of torture and deprivation of liberty in 2006

It was argued that the defense alibi that he was not in the country was not proven in the case file.

Further, it was further emphasized that the TRRC’s findings, as well as the results of the investigation, were evidence that Ousman Sonko had been part of the panel, had discussed and made important decisions together with other members. The defense’s argument that the police had been placed under the control of the NIA – where tortured was described by the UN Special Rapporteur as “routine” and “regular” – was entirely new and not supported by any evidence in the case file. Moreover, the victims who were subsequently detained were under the control of the Panel. As a result, it was argued that Ousman Sonko shares a criminal responsibility for the fate of the detainees.

Contrary to the defense’s argument, the said subsequent detention of the plaintiffs was unlawful, in particular because they were kept in custody without an arrest warrant – which was contrary to the Gambian law – and because they were not brought before a judge within the 72-hour period required by the Gambian constitution.

As for the sexual offenses that occurred during these events, and during torture, they should be tried on their own merits, in addition to the torture charges.

Killing of a politician in October 2011

It was reiterated that the victim status was fully included within the notion of “civilian population” and that there was a clear nexus between this individual offense and the attack that took place. Even if this was disputed, there was no doubt – in the view of the Prosecutor – that the accused has given instructions for the Junglers to have access to the victim when he was hospitalized. It was also proven that Ousman Sonko knew of the ins and outs of the Mile 2 detainees and that he was always aware of the President’s fear of this political opponent.

Acts of torture, murder and deprivation of liberty in 2016

The lack of evidence was argued in relation to the defense argument that the 14 April 2016 demonstration was violent. In fact, the accused written notes – together with the witnesses’ statements and material evidence – showed that it was peaceful. Likewise, it had to be concluded from the accused’s statement, that it was controlled “without any problem or resistance”. In any case, this argument could not justify the subsequent acts of torture.

It was again notably emphasized that the accused had shared the responsibility forwhat had happened to the detainees at the NIA after his police officers had handed them over to the agency, knowing what would happen to them there.

It was wrong to read from the so-called NIA-9 verdict that the accused was not present at the PIU on 14 April 2016. In fact, these proceedings did not investigate Ousman Sonko’s individual responsibility, but rather the NIA’s involvement in torture. Nevertheless, the judgment was indeed useful to understand the factual development of the events that took place on 14 and 15 April 2016 and what had happened to the victims at that time.

Irrespective of the presence of the accused at the PIU on the day of the arrests, it was clear that Ousman Sonko gave orders to take the detainees to be the NIA. Furthermore, it was never alleged that the accused himself committed acts of torture at that time, but rather that his criminal responsibility stemmed either from his active or passive co-participation in the crimes or, subsidiarily, from his hierarchical position over the acts committed by his subordinates at that time.

The case file also clearly demonstrated the accused’s responsibility for the conditions of detention imposed on the plaintiffs following their arrest and torture.

Coming next: Rebuttal of the defense.

Arguments on the parties’ credibility

The plaintiffs’ legal representatives started their closing arguments by supporting the Prosecutor’s case for the conviction of Ousman Sonko for crimes against humanity.

In general, it was argued and illustrated that Ousman Sonko had repeatedly and deliberately misled the Swiss prosecuting authorities from the beginning of the investigation. He was also selective with the evidence collected – including of the TRRC findings – and only used it when they were suiting him. He also regularly shifted the responsibility to others.

On the 14 April 2016, the defendant’ testimony was inconsistent in many respects. For example, he stated that he had to flee the country because he had refused orders of the President – the orders that corresponded to the written notes found with his personal belongings to hand over the detainees to the NIA – then, he explained that he could remember the deployment of the PIU as riot control where the demonstration had taken place. He later decided not to comment further. He was also unwilling to provide information about his telephone contacts on 14, 16 and 19 April 2016, while on the latter date, his phone analysis showed that a call had been transferred to “DG NIA”. His memory also remained selective with regard to other details, in particular, his whereabouts on the date of the events. Indeed, while he explained that he was not present at the PIU on 14 April, he explained that he was there on 16 April – on a Saturday – to do “absolutely nothing”. During another hearing, he stated that he was there “because of this unauthorized demonstration”.

Other examples were given to highlight the defendant’s lack of credibility regarding these events, throughout the trial. In particular, in light of the available evidence, it was not credible that he only learned of the death of one of the detainees on 16 April 2016, as the rumor of his death had spread rapidly among the public and the UDP. Similarly, it is absurd and contradictory to claim that he only learned of the torture of other plaintiffs during the course of the Swiss investigation, particularly considering the numerous reports published on the subject as early as April 2016.

Ousman Sonko’s claims that his subordinates – the then Director of Prison and the former IGP – acted on their own authority or without his consent were unrealistic and clearly contradicted by the evidence gathered. Moreover, both testified before the TRRC that there were serious and systematic police failures in relation to the crimes committed under the Jammeh regime.

Despite the accused’s attempts to absolve himself of responsibility, the available evidence in the case also clearly showed that it was the Minister of the Interior who coordinated the cooperation between the NIA and the police, including the cover-up of the torture.

Contrary to the statement of the accused, the plaintiffs provided the prosecuting authorities with accurate and detailed accounts of the events they experienced. This was also the case with the plaintiff who died in 2023.

Arguments on the contextual elements and on the specific crimes in question

After recalling the legal criteria for qualifying an “attack against the civilian population” (see previous highlights), it was argued that it was not legally required that such an attack would have been part of an explicit formal policy. Indeed, as had already been argued, the existence of such a policy could well be implicit.

From the case file, it was concluded that attacks against the population began at the latest in 2000 and continued until 2016, spreading to all regions of The Gambia and affecting a large number of people, both civilians and military (considered civilians in peacetime). As recently as 14 April 2026, 26 to 29 people were arrested, and on 16 April 2016, 19 people were arrested. Thus, the attack had to be considered widespread.

It should also be noted that the attack became more sophisticated over the years, with the Gambian police – particularly the PIU – playing an essential and indispensable role in the well-oiled machinery of repression.

Indeed, it was central to the repression of the Jammeh regime that both the police and the special forces of the PIU, as well as the prisons, cooperated with the NIA. It was also notorious that people detained at the NIA were tortured, and it was an integral part of the repression that opposition activists, journalists, and others perceived as opponents of the regime disappeared for months at a time, particularly at Mile 2, where they were largely or completely isolated from the outside world and held incommunicado in inhumane conditions. The judiciary was also part of the system, which was particularly highlighted in the findings of the TRRC. Thus, the attack had to be considered systematic.

Arguments on the individual offenses

Although the accused denied his criminal responsibility for all the crimes that took place on 14 April 2016, he did not deny that the plaintiffs were victims of torture and that one of them died as a result of these acts. Nevertheless, he believed that he could evade his responsibility by arguing that the arrests were lawful because the demonstration was not authorized and because the responsibility for the torture rested solely with the NIA. But these arguments were weak, especially since the prohibition of torture also applies when persons detained with the accused are handed over to torturers (so-called outsourcing of torture to third parties), which was the case on 14 April 2016 with the involvement of Ousman Sonko.

The deprivation of liberty suffered by the plaintiffs after their arrest, both at the NIA and at Mile 2, violated the most basic rules of international law, as well as Gambian procedural rules. Moreover, the plaintiffs were not brought before a court until May 2016, well beyond the three days allowed by law, were severely injured, and the court hearing clearly violated fundamental rules of international law, as the plaintiffs’ statements used by the court were taken at NIA in the context of or under the impression of torture – an element confirmed by the TRRC investigations – which is prohibited under international law.

Regarding the inhumane conditions in which the plaintiffs were kept during their detention – amounting to torture as crime against humanity – it was recalled that they were all detained as political prisoners, with no access to their families or lawyers, no serious medical treatment and difficulties to access food. These custodial conditions massively prolonged their suffering caused by torture and exacerbated by the lack of essential treatment and the plaintiffs had only been released months after their arrest, only once Yahya Jammeh had lost the elections.

The accused could not evade his responsibility in this regard by saying that he had done what he could to improve the conditions of detention, as the plaintiffs were simply not held in normal prison conditions but were treated particularly badly especially because of their status: they were critics of the government and dared to speak out against Yahya Jammeh and his dictatorship.

Ousman Sonko had clear knowledge of the context in which the crimes were committed in April 2016 and it was also proven that he had the requisite intent to commit torture, murder, to deprive the plaintiffs of their liberty and subject them to harsh conditions.

These crimes must be qualified as aggravated in view of the brutality of the acts of torture committed – sometimes combined with sexual violence and the use of various objects to beat the victims – which led to the death of one person, which causes were concealed, and in view of the ruthless character of the Jammeh’s repressive regime.

Arguments on the modes of liability

The role of the accused as co-perpetrator in the commission of the offenses in question was discussed.

In particular, it was recalled that Ousman Sonko had held a high position for many years and was very influential in 2016. He had been in charge of the police, the PIU and the prison services, whose heads reported directly to him and were bound by his instructions. The accused was a close associate and confidant of Yayha Jammeh as well as a loyal servant of the system. He had committed atrocities himself– at least at the beginning of his career, and later had delegated or facilitated them, even helping to cover up the crimes. It was further pointed out that the torture under the Jammeh had always been carried out in close cooperation and coordination between the police, prisons and the Junglers or the NIA. Ousman Sonko himself had been in close contact with the NIA, as if he had been a central actor of the cooperation between the various forces. Indeed, as highlighted by the investigation, the accused made a decisive contribution to the establishment, development and survival of the Gambian repressive regime.

The above contradicted with Ousman Sonko’s claims that he had only a decorative role at the head of the Ministry of the Interior, which were not credible and once again pointed out to the inconsistencies coming out of his testimony regarding his operational role as Minister.

With regard to the 14 April 2016, the available evidence established that Ousman Sonko had been present at the PIU on the exact day of the events but more importantly that he had given specific – or at least blanket – instructions for the plaintiffs to be taken to the NIA headquarters, respectively to Mile 2 Prison and from there to the NIA headquarters. He had done so in the knowledge that persons apprehended by the NIA were regularly subjected to severe violence and torture. However, it is not decisive whether the accused had authority over the NIA or not, the only relevant point is that it was his subordinate officers from the PIU and Mile 2 who had handed over the plaintiffs to the NIA, where they were subsequently tortured and killed, or kept in detention.

Legally, such conduct was consistent with the case law and literature applicable to the co-perpetrator.

Furthermore, it was argued that if the accused’s version – according to which he did not know anything on the day of the events, but had been informed that a violent demonstration was taking place and had done nothing at the time, while two days later he had rushed to the PIU office because he was worried about another demonstration taking place – was accepted by the court, such passive behavior should also lead to his criminal responsibility, since he was the one responsible.

Subsidiarily – and finally – it was argued that his criminal responsibility could be derived from his position of hierarchical superior.

In support of this argument, it was explained that, as Minister of the Interior, he had to be regarded as a “manager within the administration”, that the transfer of the detainees to the NIA had been carried out by his “subordinates”, and that there was a direct legal and factual superior-subordinate relationship between the police/prison officers and the accused. It was further argued that his subordinates handed over the detainees to the NIA in the full knowledge that brutal torture was regularly taking place. Similarly, the subsequent illegal detention was ensured by the defendant’s subordinate prison staff, both at Mile 2 and Janjahbureh, over whom he had effective control. In this sense, it is clear from the case file that Ousman Sonko did not intervene to stop the illegal acts committed by his subordinates (prevention – a priori of the crime), nor did he take any measure to punish those involved (prosecution or administrative sanction – a posteriori), while he himself knew not only of the attack against the civilian population, but also that the NIA was a torture agency and that the applicants were being deprived of their liberty.

The final words were addressed to the plaintiffs, who were described by their lawyer as incredibly courageous and resilient individuals – both at the time when they suffered these horrific crimes and throughout the proceedings in Switzerland.

Coming next: The closing arguments of the Defense.

The legal representative generally supported the Prosecutor’s closing arguments in favor of the conviction of Ousman Sonko for crimes against humanity.

Arguments on the contextual elements of crimes against humanity

The counsel for the plaintiffs reiterated that the policy of violent suppression of any opposition by the Jammeh regime was implemented by all security forces, that coordination between them was agreed at the highest level of the State, and that the establishment of panels to “investigate” coup attempts was a common system to attack, intimidate and silence the civilian population in the broadest sense.

Assessment of the evidence

First, it was noted that the plaintiffs’ testimony was characterized by its consistency, clarity and lack of contradiction. Second, their free statements before the Court were eloquent and convincing. The internal coherence of the statements showed that there was an identical and well-rehearsed modus operandi that was carried out several times. Their testimony was further corroborated by other material evidence in the case file.

With regard to the three witnesses interviewed in the course of the investigation – who were part of the panel representing the NIA and the State Guard, and some of whom were high-ranking members – it had to be taken into account in assessing their credibility that they may have feared incriminating themselves. Indeed, one of the witnesses remained very evasive, another incriminated himself – and thus largely confirmed the plaintiffs’ statements – and should therefore be given more credibility. Finally, the third witness remained ambivalent, giving many details but remaining evasive on some other aspects, especially when it came to his own role.

In any case, the three confirmed that the panel was composed of all the security forces and that Ousman Sonko, as IGP, was repeatedly present at the panel’s meetings.

As for the work of the TRRC – which the defense only used when it was to its advantage – it was useful evidence for the Court to form its internal conviction, especially since the entire proceedings were conducted in public.

It was also argued that the defendant continued to evade, contradict, and make manifestly false statements, as well as selective use of his rights.

Overall, the information provided by the accused was neither coherent nor consistent in itself, nor consistent with the other files, the interrogations, the Gambian legal assistance file, nor the TRRC proceedings. Finally, it was not consistent with common life experience or with any kind of logic.

Argument on each charge

In essence, the evidence in the case file showed – and thus proved – that on 21, 24, 28 March 2006, three applicants were arrested for their alleged involvement in an attempted coup on 21 March 2006.

They were all taken to Mile 2 and the NIA headquarters without a warrant and without having seen a judge. Their detention lasted until 19 April 2006 for two of them and 4 weeks for the third victim, who was arrested and detained again for several weeks in October of the same year. These detentions were illegal under Gambian law and therefore arbitrary and contrary to international law. They were held in appalling conditions.

In addition, all three were victims of various forms of torture, which, according to the Prosecutor, should be judged in the light of the aggravated offense of crimes against humanity.

Modes of liability

It was argued that Ousman Sonko should be recognized as an accomplice in the commission of the crimes in question because he played a decisive role in the joint decision to commit the offense, as well as in the joint coordinated execution of the crimes and because he jointly contributed to their commission.

Indeed, the accused had been a powerful man within the repressive system in place, as IGP. He had actually supported the implementation of Jammeh’s regime policy of attacks against the civilian population and occupied three of the most important positions in the apparatus, where President Jammeh only appointed people he fully trusted. Several witness testimonies – as well as material evidence available – confirmed this particularly close relationship that existed between the accused and the former President. In addition, it was noted that the accused was appointed as Minister of Interior shortly after having dealt with the March coup attempt for the President.

Furthermore, as IGP, Ousman Sonko was at the center of the Gambian security forces – which collaborated at all levels – and, thus, at the center repression apparatus:

It was further argued that the accused could not evade his responsibilities deriving by claiming he had no de jure or de facto control over the NIA or the Junglers, especially since the strategic and operational cooperation of all the security forces was aimed at keeping Yahya Jammeh in power.

With regard to the specific events of March 2006, it was recalled that Ousman Sonko was immediately informed by the army chief of the coup attempt and, considering his official position as well as his status as Jammeh’s closest confident, he was the one responsible for the State’s response to the serious threat of a coup d’état.

It has been established– in particular through the statements of the plaintiffs’ statements as well as through several witnesses’ statements – that Ousman Sonko was indeed part of the panel set up to investigate the coup and that it included all Gambian security forces, including the State Guard and the Junglers. He actually confirmed that he had to appoint the police members of the panel. As for the panel’s supervision, it was proven that, as IGP, he was amongst the three responsible ones and that decisions were taken in collaboration between them. In addition, it was established from the statements in the case file that the defendant was present when the plaintiffs were released.

In light of the above, Ousman Sonko’s statement that he knew almost no one on the Panel was completely implausible and had to be rejected an attempt on his part to evade his responsibility. Likewise, the accused’s statements – which varied considerably during the course of the investigation – that he had only been present for one hour on the first evening of the Panel’s interrogation, that he had not witnessed any acts of violence and that he had not seen any armed men, in particular no Junglers, must be considered as completely untrustworthy. Moreover, it was contradicted by all plaintiffs and witnesses heard in the course of these proceedings.

Overall, the defendant also failed to make an alternative story – in which his criminal responsibility would not be at stake – credible.

It was then argued that Ousman Sonko acted with the knowledge and intent to commit all the crimes he is with which he is charged. In particular, he knew that torture, including sexual violence, was illegal under the Gambian and international law, as well as how the regime dealt with critics. He also knew the Junglers involved in the events (both their existence as a group and the individuals within that group and the exactions for which they were known).

Any statement to the contrary made by the accused could not be believed, as they were obviously made in order to evade any responsibility.

Coming next: Closing arguments on the 14 April 2016 events.

The Plaintiffs’ counsel began her closing arguments by generally supporting the Prosecutor’s case for the conviction of Ousman Sonko for crimes against humanity, particularly in support of her clients who were victims of atrocities in 2000 and 2006.

Pleading on the contextual elements of the crimes against humanity

The argumentation started with a reminder of the Gambian context with a particular focus on the years 2000 to 2006.

There was no doubt that the security agencies of the Gambian state apparatus were working together in a well-coordinated manner and that Yahya Jammeh was not acting alone. During the investigation, Ousman Sonko even stated that there were weekly meetings of the National Security Council to discuss national security issues and that he had participated in these meetings both as Inspector General of Police (IGP) and as Minister of the Interior. The brutal crimes committed in the name of the state took place in a climate of absolute impunity, and the perpetrators were not held accountable, but rather were being rewarded with promotions and favors: the defendant benefited from the system and was promoted.

It was also emphasized that the regime has committed many violations over the years, leading to the conclusion that the civilian population is under attack. The violent suppression of a student rally in April 2000, the attempted assassination of a lawyer critical of the regime in December 2003, the murder of the editor of The Point in December 2004, and the killing of more than 50 West African migrants in July 2005 were cited as examples.

In this case, both the general and the systematic nature of the above-mentioned attack were well established. However, in order to reinforce the general character of the attack, it was emphasized that the Gambian society is highly interconnected due to the small size of the country, but also due to the extended family system and, beyond that, the Gambian social environment. This leads to the conclusion that, in addition to the number of victims, the temporal and geographical elements that support the general character of the attack, each individual crime resulted in a higher number of people affected because of the Gambian social structure.

With regard to the systematic nature of the attacks, it was also emphasized – in addition to the arguments of the prosecutor – that the cooperation between the different services was embedded in the structure of the dictatorship from the very beginning: already in 1997, the PIU and the NIA were involved in the violent repression of UDP members, which led to arrests and acts of torture.

The attacks also targeted certain categories of people, such as journalists and, more generally, the media, from the early years of the regime, which was also highlighted in the findings of the TRRC. It was also important to note that journalists from government-owned newspapers were not spared: persecution of journalists from the Daily Observer was evident throughout the years, for example in 2001 and 2006.

It was therefore clear that the journalists arrested and tortured in March 2006 had been targeted by the regime in connection with their work and their coverage of the coup attempt.

With regard to Ousman Sonko’s knowledge of the aforementioned systematic and generalized attacks against the Gambian civilian population, it was emphasized that, although he claimed to have learned of the crimes of the Jammeh regime only through the TRRC or the present proceedings, it was clear from the record and from the testimony heard before the Court that the accused was part of the inner circle of power around the former President from the beginning to almost the end. As highlighted by the Prosecutor, the accused participated in Jammeh’s coup in 1994 and joined the State Guard in 1995. He then gradually rose within the apparatus, becoming IGP without any police training or experience, and eventually reaching the position of Minister of Interior.

Given the military and central office positions he held from 1995 to 2016, the accused cannot credibly claim to have been unaware of the gross human rights violations and numerous crimes that took place. The accused could not have occupied key positions of power for years without knowing about such attacks.

Indeed, there is no doubt that the accused was aware of the policy of systematic persecution of real or perceived critics of the regime in the context of his respective position, whether in the military, as IGP or as Minister of the Interior. In September 2016, he left the country as soon as possible after falling out of favor with Jammeh, knowing full well what awaited him in that situation: arbitrary detention, torture, disappearance and/or death.

Arguments on the individual charges

With regard to the murder of a member of the State Guard in January 2000, the representative returned to the testimony of the various witnesses, as well as the testimony of the widow of the deceased – who is a plaintiff in the case – and compared it with the testimony of the accused on these events.

In essence, it was argued that the witnesses – a former member of the State House Battalion and a former Jungler – provided credible information about the planning as well as the operation that led to the killing and in which the defendant was involved. The plaintiff, for her part, provided credible information that was also consistent with the testimony of the witnesses. It was added that the plaintiff commented in great detail, in a coherent and consistent manner, on the events she remembered on the day her husband was lured into an ambush.

Ousman Sonko, for his part, selectively exercised his right to remain silent on these charges, which was not to his advantage. While he told the court that he could not comment due to a duty of confidentiality, he made some isolated statements during the investigation. In particular, he said that the plaintiff was wrong when she stated that he had taken the victim’s position after his death.

It was also emphasized that Ousman Sonko had been identified by the TRRC as part of a collective of perpetrators responsible for this murder.

At the time of the crime, the accused had already been in the army for 12 years and had served in the State Guard since 1995. He was in the same unit as the victim. He knew what he had to do to take his place at the president’s side, and any means were acceptable to him. The killing was part of a list of systematic violations that already existed at the time of the offense, which means that the crime was committed as part of the attack against the civilian population that took place, and no grounds for justification or exclusion of guilt are apparent or have been raised to date.

As requested by the Prosecutor, it was concluded that Ousman Sonko should be convicted of aggravated murder as a crime against humanity, given the atrocity of the acts in question.

With regard to the charges of sexual violence, which Ousman Sonko is accused of having committed on several occasions against the widow of the deceased, the course of events was reconstructed on the basis of credible and consistent statements made by the plaintiff. According to her statements, very soon after the murder of her husband, she lost her job, her children were no longer allowed to enroll in school by order of the Minister of Education, and the defendant began to “search for her”, even during the period of mourning. This was followed by an “intensive phase” of sexual abuse and threats over many months. The sexual assaults continued from mid/end 2000 until late 2001/early 2002, when they increased again. Severe violence occurred again in January 2005 when the plaintiff returned to The Gambia for a short stay.

Although he never responded in detail to these charges, Ousman Sonko stated that he had not been in the country at the time of the crimes. However, the evidence in the case file showed that he had only been absent twice, each time for one week, making these absences insignificant and of negligible duration, and therefore not convincing.

The events suffered by the plaintiff should lead the Court to find Ousman Sonko guilty of aggravated deprivation of liberty, aggravated torture and aggravated violation of sexual self-determination through rape as crimes against humanity, emphasizing that he acted with the specific intention of punishing or possessing her as the widow of his eliminated opponent. Consequently, the sexualized violence perpetrated by the accused can also be included in the concept of torture.

According to the available evidence in the case file, Ousman Sonko had a reputation as a “womanizer”, which should be understood as “a man who takes what he wants”, and it was clear from the file that he acted in the exercise of his function or at least by using his power or the resources available to him by virtue of his position. It was also clear that the plaintiff was not an accidental victim, but had been specifically targeted.

For these reasons, the acts in question should not be considered as personal or isolated acts, but as having taken place in the context of the widespread sexualized violence against women during the Jammeh regime.

With regard to the allegations of torture and deprivation of liberty made against two journalists – private plaintiffs – in March 2006, it was recalled that both of them had given credible accounts of the events they had experienced, with relevant and accurate details. Their testimony was further corroborated by several pieces of evidence and newspaper articles.

While the accused did not dispute the testimony of the two victims, he denied any knowledge or involvement in these events. In particular, he claimed that his deputy – in coordination with other high-ranking individuals – had been responsible for the deployment of the police after the coup attempt in March 2006. He also denied any responsibility as a member of the Investigation Committee before the prosecutor, although his statements in this regard became vaguer before the court.

The events that the plaintiffs experienced as journalists in March 2006 should lead the Court to find Ousman Sonko guilty of aggravated deprivation of liberty and aggravated torture, as well as aggravated violation of sexual self-determination, as crimes against humanity.

It was emphasized that the electric shocks inflicted on the genitals of one of the plaintiffs should be recognized as a form of torture through sexualized violence. In order to fully reflect the injustice of this gendered aspect of torture, the facts of the case had to be explicitly assessed from this perspective. At the time the plaintiff was subjected to gender-based violence, he was in a state of absolute defenselessness. He was incarcerated and therefore completely restricted in his freedom of movement and at the mercy of his torturers.

Coming next: The closing arguments of the legal representative of the other victims of the 2006 events.